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Americans are governed by a concept known as the “rule of law.”  It 
is an idea we embrace so passionately that we seek to instill it in 
developing countries.  One of the hallmarks of the rule of law in 
Anglo-American thinking is legal certainty:  the concept that the 
“government in all its actions is [to be] bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand.”1  These fixed rules include the freedom of 
expression and association and the recognition that the act of giving 
 ∗ Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Law, International 
Assessment and Strategy Center, on a one-year leave of absence from the 
Counterterrorism Section of the U.S. Department of Justice.  The views in this Article 
are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the Department of Justice. 
 1. GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 6 
(Basic Books 1979) (quoting FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1976)). 
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money is sometimes protected from government infringement 
because it involves these freedoms.2
This legal certainty, of course, does not mean that the government 
may not regulate financial transactions, as we have many federal 
agencies doing just that.  Rather, it means that official actions cannot 
unduly infringe on “expressive association,” lest these actions be 
ruled unconstitutional.3  Legal certainty is achieved by seeing how 
courts have judged government actions in the face of claims that 
those actions violate the First Amendment. 
This Article seeks to show that legal certainty has been achieved in 
an arena that is very important:    whether the U.S. government can 
limit the giving of money to terrorist groups.  In this field, there is a 
regulatory regime, a series of statutes, and a corpus of prosecutions 
and civil lawsuits arising from these laws that the American courts 
have found to comport with the First Amendment.4  The test for legal 
certainty is relatively easy, if one agrees that the question is binary:    
either the enactment of a particular rule or law, or government 
action in initiating a criminal prosecution or permitting a private civil 
action, is constitutional, or it is not.  The cases where these 
arguments are considered provide the answer.  It is just a matter of 
keeping score until it gets rather lopsided and then declaring a 
winner and concluding that the constitutional issue has been settled.5  
At that point, people know exactly what is prohibited, to the extent 
there was any doubt. 
If legal certainty has been achieved, why do we still see claims that 
the United States’ actions in the counterterrorism field violate the 
First Amendment?  Good question.  The only explanation is that 
there are still lawyers and legal strategists engaging in wishful 
thinking, almost to the point of bad faith.  The problem with this 
practice, beyond wasting judicial resources, is the inconsistency, since 
their arguments—if accepted—would take the United States away 
 2. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Yet this Court has never 
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money 
operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny 
required by the First Amendment.”). 
 3. See id. at 25 (stating that there is a fundamental right to free speech and 
freedom of association protected by the Constitution, which the government can 
abridge but only if its abridgement survives strict scrutiny analysis). 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 143 (holding congressional action limiting an individual’s free 
speech via campaign contributions to be constitutional). 
 5. By this statement, I do not mean to imply that there are no more 
constitutional controversies in American counterterrorism efforts.  Rather, I am 
asserting that certain aspects of these efforts are now constitutionally settled, as 
described in this Article. 
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from the goal of the rule of law and jeopardize legal tools about 
which these strategists themselves are enthusiastic. 
This Article seeks to illustrate this point.  Part I describes the easy 
cases on constitutional counterterrorism in America.  Part II takes 
them a step further and discusses the constitutional challenges as 
American counterterrorism efforts have sought to reach the non-
violent actors in the terrorist infrastructure, by attacking the act of 
giving money.  Part III considers the next constitutional battlefield 
and explains why people who continue to push the view that terrorist 
financing cannot be constitutionally targeted through legal 
proceedings will, if successful, eliminate remedies they themselves 
enjoy. 
I. THE EASY PRINCIPLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM 
In counterterrorism and the First Amendment, there is an easy 
principle:    One cannot rely on the First Amendment to defend 
oneself from being punished for engaging in politically inspired 
violence.6  This is true even though the First Amendment arguably 
protects political expression more than other types of speech-related 
conduct.7  For example, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman failed in his 
attempt to cloak his violent conduct in First Amendment-protected 
activity,8 as did American jihadist John Walker Lindh.9  They each 
acted according to their religious beliefs.10  Both are now in prison.11
What about people whose conduct was further removed from 
violence?  In Virginia after 9/11, Sheik Ali al-Timimi was convicted of 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting 
that Rahman’s challenge to his conviction—arguing that the Seditious Conspiracy 
Statute violated his freedom of speech—was not a valid claim). 
 7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (“The First Amendment affords the broadest 
protection to such political expression in order to assure [the] unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 8. See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 114 (arguing that the seditious conspiracy statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2384, was facially unconstitutional and overbroad and that his conviction 
“rested solely on his political views and religious practices”). 
 9. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“There 
is, in other words, a clear line between the First Amendment protected activity and 
criminal conduct for which there is no constitutional protection.”). 
 10. See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 103 (describing Rahman as a Islamic scholar and 
cleric leading a jihad against the enemies of Islam and as viewing the United States as 
the primary oppressor of Muslims); Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 565–66 (highlighting 
Lindh’s contention that he provided services to the Taliban for religious reasons in 
contrast to others who did so for non-religious reasons). 
 11. See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 111 (sentencing Rahman to life in prison); Lindh, 
227 F. Supp. 2d at 572) (sentencing Lindh to 240 months in prison). 
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soliciting his adherents to travel abroad to engage in violence.12  A key 
factor in judging his First Amendment challenge was whether his 
speech, which occurred in the context of a religious sermon, was 
“imminent.”13  This concept is a settled one and originated in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,14 where a Ku Klux Klan leader was prosecuted 
under an Ohio statute that criminalized being a member of an 
organization that advocated criminal syndicalism (terrorism as a 
means of effecting political change).15  It was in Brandenburg that the 
Supreme Court issued these famous words: 
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action. . . .  A statute which fails to draw this 
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  It sweeps within its 
condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from 
governmental control.16
So there you have it, some element of legal certainty:    Statutes 
that criminalize advocacy, and prosecutions arising out of them, are 
only constitutional if they include within their scope only speech that 
reaches the incitement of imminent lawlessness.17  Did Sheik al-
Timimi’s prosecution qualify?  As Professor Wayne McCormack has 
noted, the al-Timimi case unquestionably pushes the envelope of 
incitement law because al-Timimi’s actions were “at least two steps 
removed from physical violence.”18  However, it did not help al-
Timimi’s constitutional arguments that some of his adherents actually 
complied with his words and in fact traveled abroad to engage in 
violence.19  Not only was the threat imminent, but it actually 
happened.20
 12. See United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 369 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that Ali al-Timimi was convicted of solicitation to levy war, among other things, in 
2005). 
 13. See generally Robert S. Tanenbaum, Comment, Preaching Terror:  Free Speech or 
Wartime Incitement?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 785 (2006) (discussing the al-Timimi conviction 
and whether his speech was protected by his First Amendment rights or prohibited as 
unlawful incitement). 
 14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 15. Id. at 444–45. 
 16. Id. at 447–48. 
 17. See id. 
 18. WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 122 (LexisNexis 
2007). 
 19. See Indictment of Defendant at 6–8, United States v. Al-Timimi, No. 1:04cr385 
(E.D. Va. 2004), available at http://www.milnet.com/terr-prosecutions/al-
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So speech that threatens violence may be constitutionally 
prosecuted.  Consider a case from a few years ago in which a 
defendant was convicted of cross-burning with “an intent to 
intimidate.”21  In upholding the conviction, over First Amendment 
objections, the Supreme Court recognized that the government has a 
legitimate interest in preventing fear: 
 “True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker 
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.  The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the 
threat.  Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals 
from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that fear 
engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur.”  Intimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true 
threat, where the speaker directs a threat to a person or group of 
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm 
or death.22
Thus, we can draw the line between protected and proscribed 
speech, even where the speech is political and therefore entitled to 
the highest degree of First Amendment protection.23  For example, 
the ability to vocalize one’s disagreement with the President is surely 
one of the key objects of the First Amendment.24  That does not 
prevent the government from prosecuting someone for the crime of 
threatening the life of the President, an essentially verbal crime.25  
Even if the threat is merely an expression of political disagreement, 
the government can constitutionally punish these speakers.26  For 
example, in the case of a threat to the President, the Secret Service is 
deployed at the mere mention of the prospect.  This vigilance is 
Timimi_indict.pdf (recounting al-Timimi’s instructions to others that training in 
Pakistan was appropriate, as well as how to reach the camp undetected, and the 
individual’s actions in reaching the training camp). 
 20. On appeal, al-Timimi moved to have his conviction vacated and remanded, 
and the court granted his motion.  United States v. Al-Timimi, No. 05-4761, CR-04-
385, 2006 US App. LEXIS 32554, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2006). 
 21. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003). 
 22. Id. at 359–60 (citations omitted). 
 23. See id. at 365–67 (explaining that cross-burning may be considered to be 
either proscribable intimidation, or protected political speech, and declaring the 
Virginia statute at issue unconstitutional for blurring the line between what is 
proscribed and what is protected). 
 24. See id. at 361–62 (noting that the First Amendment protects most content-
based speech from governmental prohibition). 
 25. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2000) (proscribing threats made against the President of 
the United States). 
 26. See id. (stating any threat to the President “shall be fined . . . or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both”). 
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essential to prevent harm, which means the threat causes 
consequences that should be discouraged through the risk of 
prosecution. 
II. GIVING MONEY TO TERRORISTS 
What about when the expressive association is represented by the 
act of giving money?  Can non-violent financial supporters of 
terrorists be constitutionally prosecuted?  There is no question that 
they can be.  In 1994, Congress enacted the first “material support” 
law, which criminalized the act of providing funds “knowing or 
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying 
out, [a terrorism crime].”27  This statute is constitutional, despite the 
fact that the act of giving money is also an act of expression, because 
it requires proof that the defendant intended to support violence.28  
This would seem to comport with Brandenburg.29
The intent element of this first “material support” statute—the 
price of it being obviously constitutional—is so exacting that the 
statute has limited utility.  Realizing this, Congress two years later 
enacted the second material support crime statute, which prohibits 
“knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization . . . .”30  It is this second statute—18 U.S.C.  
§ 2339B—and the prosecutions arising under it that have generated 
First Amendment litigation that continues to this day.31
This is not particularly surprising.  Where the designated foreign 
terrorist organizations included Islamic groups, the First Amendment 
issue was in some ways inevitable because Islamic law mandates that 
members give alms, known as zakat, calculated on the basis of 
accumulated wealth.32  Thus, the giving of money to groups that 
represent their objectives to be humanitarian complicates Western 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2000). 
 28. See id. (proscribing material support to terrorists where the individual 
“know[s] or intend[s] that [the material is] . . . to be used in preparation for, or in 
carrying out” proscribed acts). 
 29. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting that a state can 
proscribe speech “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).  The courts sometimes refer to this statute as the 
AEDPA—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Chandi, 514 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) (involving 
a defense by Chandi that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B was unconstitutional because it violated 
his First Amendment rights). 
 32. See Raj Bhala, Theological Categories for Special and Differential Treatment, 50 KAN. 
L. REV. 635, 677 (discussing the five pillars of Islam:  profession of faith, prayer, alms 
(zakat), fasting, and pilgrimage). 
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efforts to prevent the flow of funds to Islamic groups that both help 
people and engage in violence, such as Hizballah and Hamas.33
In enacting § 2339B, Congress intended to prohibit all financial 
support to terrorist groups, including donations intended for purely 
humanitarian purposes.34  Persons who unwittingly provide such 
funding cannot be prosecuted, since the statute requires the donor to 
“knowing[ly]” support terrorism.35  The questions faced by the courts 
included whether financial support for a group’s political or 
humanitarian activities could be constitutionally criminalized.36
The First Amendment challenge to the government’s ability to 
prohibit the transfer of United States-based funds—“humanitarian” 
funds—to designated terrorist organizations came in the form of one 
prospective criminal prosecution and five actual ones.37
The prospective one involved the claim by a charity that wanted to 
support the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that  
§ 2339B chills its freedom of association.38
Plaintiffs claim that such support would be directed to aid only the 
nonviolent humanitarian and political activities of the designated 
organizations.  Being prohibited from giving this support, they 
argue, infringes their associational rights under the First 
Amendment.  Because the statute criminalizes the giving of 
material support to an organization regardless of whether the 
donor intends to further the organization’s unlawful ends, 
plaintiffs claim it runs afoul of [the First Amendment].39
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument.40  As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski wrote, 
The statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the 
designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the 
political goals of the group.  Plaintiffs are even free to praise the 
groups for using terrorism as a means of achieving their ends.  
What [§ 2339B] prohibits is the act of giving material support, and 
 33. See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (Hamas); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(Hizballah).
 34. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining Congress’s concern that terrorist organizations would 
receive funding “under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise”) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., Chandi, 514 F.3d at 371 (assessing the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2339B, which criminalizes material support to terrorist organizations). 
 37. See infra notes 38, 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing the hypothetical 
and actual cases, respectively). 
 38. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 39. Id. at 1133. 
 40. Id. 
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there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving 
terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out their 
grisly missions.  Nor, of course, is there a right to provide resources 
with which terrorists can buy weapons and explosives.41
Money, it seems, is different from pure speech.  Sure, the act of 
transferring money has First Amendment symbolism.  However, 
money is also more difficult to control because it is fungible, which 
means even donations that are motivated by benevolence can be 
mixed with other receipts, thereby freeing up more proceeds which 
terrorist groups may use to kill people.  In addition, the government 
limits what people can do with their money all the time.  One cannot 
give an unlimited amount of money to a political candidate of one’s 
choice.42  One cannot buy Cuban cigars from Fidel Castro.43  What 
you do with your money is not sacrosanct.  Financial transactions may 
be regulated and are regulated.  This regulation is constitutional.  
The government’s authority to regulate financial transactions is 
supported by a long history of precedent, dealing with campaign 
financing rules and the President’s embargo authority, among other 
things.44
The actual “material support” prosecutions involved people 
charged with providing funds to Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), and worldwide Islamic jihad generally.45  In 
these cases, the courts denied the defendants’ First Amendment 
claims, each of which was based on the argument that the 
government cannot constitutionally limit the sending of funds to 
terrorist organizations.46
 41. Id. 
 42. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1979) (holding the contribution 
limitation to individual political candidates constitutional). 
 43. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6010 (2000) (codifying the trade embargo with Cuba 
and providing sanctions for U.S. citizens and corporations that violate the embargo). 
 44. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (highlighting that restrictions 
on campaign contributions and trade with Cuba are permissible impingements upon 
one’s right to expend money as one sees fit). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that Hammoud was convicted on several counts for his support of 
Hizballah); United States v. Marzook, No. 03 CR 0978, 2005 WL 3095543, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 17, 2005) (noting that the indictment was for the defendant’s alleged 
assistance to Hamas); United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (noting that the accused allegedly supported the PIJ through operating and 
directing fundraising activities in the United States).
 46. See, e.g., Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 329 (rejecting the argument that § 2339B 
impermissibly restricts the First Amendment right of association); United States v. 
Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2004452, at *1 
(N.D. Tex. July 11, 2007) (rejecting the argument that that the government had 
criminalized their religious obligation to engage in zakat-charitable giving); United 
States v. Jayyousi, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 781373, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2007) 
(stating that there is no First Amendment protection for providing resources 
  
2008] RESOLVED, OR IS IT? 1281 
                                                          
When it comes to giving funds to terrorist organizations, it seems 
the law is settled.  Money—even “humanitarian money,” funds 
intended for benevolent purposes—simply cannot go to foreign 
groups that engage in political violence.  People who knowingly defy 
this prohibition can be prosecuted.47  People can also be 
constitutionally prosecuted for the separate crime of lying about their 
terrorist-support activities.48
There has yet to be a court that disagrees with this conclusion, yet 
the argument that § 2339B infringes on speech and amounts to an 
unconstitutional assessment of “guilt by association” has been pushed 
time and time again, without success.49  When it comes to the act of 
giving funds to designated terrorist groups, the constitutionality of 
the § 2339B prohibition is so well established that it can be 
considered a legal certainty.50
III. WHAT ABOUT PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCIERS? 
There is an aspect of American counterterrorism efforts that has 
not been considered as much as criminal prosecutions:    the legal 
remedies that permit private parties to sue terrorists in American 
courts on behalf of the people they have killed and injured. 
The civil counterpart to U.S. counterterrorism is just that, since its 
power lies in its borrowing from § 2339B jurisprudence.  Congress 
saw fit to permit federal civil actions in American courts on behalf of 
victims killed and injured by the actions of international terrorist 
organizations.51  The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (“ATA”) provides: 
knowing and/or intending that they will be used for terrorist activities); Marzook, 
2005 WL 3095543, at *4–6 (rejecting the argument that the indictment impinges on 
defendant’s First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association); Al-Arian, 
308 F. Supp. 2d at 1341–42 (rejecting the argument that the indictment attempts to 
criminalize their First Amendment rights of speech in support of and association 
with the PIJ). 
 47. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that to be liable under 
the statute a donor must know he is supporting terrorism). 
 48. Cf. United States v. Mubayyid, 476 F. Supp. 2d 46, 52 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The 
Court sees no reason why providing a complete and truthful description of the 
organization’s planned activities in order to obtain tax-exempt status—whether or 
not those activities are religiously motivated—inhibits or substantially burdens the 
exercise of religious freedom.”). 
 49. See, e.g., supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 50. I am not referring to the “training,” “personnel,” and “expert assistance” type 
of prohibited “material support,” where the constitutional issue is admittedly a closer 
one.  My argument that the constitutionality of § 2339B is clear involves its use 
against those who provide funds to terrorists.  I am also not referring to the question 
of whether the terrorist designation system complies with principles of due process, 
which is not a First Amendment issue. 
 51. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000)), rev’d, 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007) 
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Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, 
or his or her estate, survivors or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and . . . recover 
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney’s fees.52
With the advent of § 2339B, the terrorism-related statute extending 
criminal culpability to those who provide humanitarian money to 
terrorist groups, plaintiffs in the ATA cases realized that they were 
also beneficiaries of the law because it extended liability to people in 
the United States who have provided money to international rogues. 
Like criminal defendants charged under § 2339B, the 
organizations and individuals sued in these cases, and their 
supporters cried foul, arguing that this civil remedy infringed on 
their First Amendment rights.53  A court that considered this 
argument explained that the conduct defined by the criminal 
material support statutes qualifies as an act of “international 
terrorism” itself and therefore can establish civil liability under the 
ATA.54  Thus, people sued under the ATA were stuck with the settled 
jurisprudence on the constitutionality of § 2339B, and the ATA 
plaintiffs were the beneficiaries.55  Thereafter, courts in the ATA cases 
involving the transfer of money construed the pleadings according to 
the law relating to § 2339B.56  This meant that banks could be sued 
under the ATA for their financial transactions with terrorists.57
It is ironic that these Islamic litigants so often cloak themselves in 
First Amendment values,58 where Muslims so frequently seek through 
(addressing a cause of action brought under the Antiterrorism Act to hold 
defendants civilly liable for acts of international terrorism). 
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 2333. 
 53. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) (stating that “§§ 2339A and 2339B clearly indicate that Congress did view 
[material support]” as international terrorism for which the ATA provides a cause of 
action). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(suing financial institutions for the plaintiffs’ injuries from terrorist activities). 
 56. See, e.g., id. (relying on § 2339B in dismissing claims of defendant bank, which 
engaged in acts of international terrorism by providing material support to terrorist 
organizations). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 587 (“Section 2339B is violated if [a] Bank provides material 
support in the form of financial services to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization and the Bank either knows of the designation or knows that the 
designated organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activities.”).  
 58. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(assessing Noah’s First Amendment claims alleging that AOL terminated his account 
and failed to restore previous postings in order to prevent his and other Muslims pro-
Islam speech); Islamic Soc’y of Boston v. Boston Herald, Inc., No. 05-4637, 2006 WL 
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litigation to prevent the dissemination of information of which they 
do not like.59  The First Amendment is not a one-way street.  It is not a 
weapon to defend your own speech and association while insisting on 
the right to control that of others.  The rule of law means neutral 
operation and application of legal principles. 
Is this happening with private terrorism lawsuits?  It would be 
disturbing if the individuals who argue that financing terrorism is 
constitutional also simultaneously avail themselves of the legal 
remedies they attack.  Are the critics of § 2339B attacking the tools 
Congress has granted victims of terrorism, while relying on them? 
For example, following a recent decision by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in one of these civil cases, 
the Council on American Islamic Relations (“CAIR”) issued a press 
release that suggested the “rule of law” requires that the Muslim 
organization defendants be exonerated: 
The defendants in this case have endured a seven-year legal battle 
in which their reputations have been smeared and their assets 
confiscated.  While the destruction of American Muslim groups 
who have committed no wrong-doing is irreparable, today’s 
decision, in which the rules of law were finally applied, helps 
restore the American people’s trust in the system.60
In fact, the opinion CAIR heralded was not a vindication for these 
Muslim groups or a ruling that they committed no wrongdoing.61  
2423287, at *12 (Mass. Super. July 21, 2006) (addressing the First Amendment 
argument for a right to petition). 
 59. See Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 662 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (addressing a defamation suit for Ballenger’s statement explaining that he 
and his wife split in part because they lived across the street from CAIR); Global 
Relief Found., Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 390 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2004) (involving a 
libel and slander lawsuit for reporting that the Global Relief Foundation was accused 
of providing funds to Bin Laden); Ghafur v. Bernstein, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 627 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (addressing a libel suit for a letter stating that an investigation 
into Ghafur should be made due to his ties with Islam); Talal v. Fanning, 506 F. 
Supp. 186, 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (involving a suit about a television movie depicting 
the execution of a Saudi Princess for adultery, alleging that it was defamatory to 
Islam); Mumin v. Dees, 663 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Neb. 2003) (addressing a libel suit for 
statements made concerning members of the Islamic Faith); Farrakhan v. N.Y.P. 
Holdings, Inc., 638 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (assessing a libel suit 
brought by Minister Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam against an article published 
by the New York Post); Khan v. Newsweek, Inc., 554 N.Y.S.2d 119, 119 (App. Div. 1990) 
(involving a libel suit brought by Khan alleging libel based on an article published 
that stated a businessman was linked to arms dealing in a new business in Peshawar). 
 60. Press Release, CAIR, CAIR Welcomes Overturning of $156M Judgment in 
Charity Case (Dec. 28, 2007), http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?mid1= 
777&&ArticleID=24013&&name=n&&currPage=1 [hereinafter CAIR Press Release] 
(discussing Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th 
Cir. 2007)). 
 61. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 
2007) (remanding for a determination of causation).
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Rather, the case was a remand back to the trial court with instructions 
on how the plaintiffs—whose son was killed in 1996 by Hamas, which 
was allegedly aided by financial contributions of persons and 
organizations within the United States—could satisfy the causation 
element to the Seventh Circuit’s satisfaction.62  What about these 
defendants?  One of them, the Holy Land Foundation (“HLF”), was 
described by the Seventh Circuit in a manner that hardly suggests, as 
CAIR asserted, it was wrongly accused: 
The ample record evidence (particularly taking into account the 
classified information presented to the court in camera) establishing 
HLF’s role in the funding of Hamas and of its terrorist activities is 
incontrovertible. . . .  Even following the district court’s judgment, 
while HLF attempted to supplement the record on appeal, the 
supplementary material could not have defeated the proposition 
established by the record evidence that Holy Land was a funder of 
the terrorist organization Hamas.63
So what does CAIR mean when it refers to the “rules of law”?64  Is it 
referring to legal certainty and the application of neutral principles 
to different people—such as the notion that the U.S. government can 
constitutionally prevent people from giving money to Hamas?  If so, 
this is not something CAIR or the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”)65 believes has been sufficiently settled.66
The rule of law, understood in the context of civil lawsuits, 
properly suggests that the jurisprudence that has settled the 
constitutionality of § 2339B would allow groups like CAIR and the 
ACLU to avail themselves of the same tort remedies being used 
against various Muslim groups—those accused of supporting 
Hamas—to sue people they believed to be international villains.  The 
problem is that if they have done so, they cannot very well attack 
those legal remedies as being unconstitutional, without being fairly 
 62. Id.
 63. Id. at 724. 
 64. CAIR Press Release, supra note 60. 
 65. On December 11, 2007, the ACLU disseminated the following statement: 
Some of [the terms of § 2339B] are so sweeping that they encompass activity 
that is protected by the First Amendment . . . .  In its current form, the 
statute allows a person to be criminally prosecuted for donations that may be 
entirely innocent, because the statute fails to require the government to 
show that the donor actually intended to support illegal activity.  We 
continue to believe that, in its current form, the entire law is 
unconstitutional. 
Press Release, ACLU, Court Rules “Material Support” Provision of Patriot Act 
Unconstitutional (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/33115prs 
20071211.html. 
 66. See id. (“We continue to believe that, in its current form, the entire law is 
unconstitutional.”). 
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accused of hypocrisy.  The rule of law surely cannot mean that the 
legal remedies are constitutional when they are useful to you but are 
otherwise constitutionally infirm. 
Has this happened?  Consider that the Center for Constitutional 
Rights (“CCR”), the organization employing the lawyers who have 
most vehemently argued that material support statutes are 
unconstitutional, has represented plaintiffs suing an American 
equipment manufacturer for products it shipped to Israel.67  As a 
further example, a lawyer who argued that the government could not 
constitutionally limit support to the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party68 also served as the plaintiffs’ attorney in lawsuits 
seeking damages on behalf of an economist killed by Chilean military 
officers,69 persons injured and killed by Ethiopian guards,70 
Argentinean soldiers,71 and El Salvadorian death squads,72 as well as 
Burmese villagers dislocated as a result of a pipeline involving 
Unocal.73  The ACLU, which has continued to argue that § 2339B 
 67. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2005), 
aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 68. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(noting the argument that prohibiting support to terrorist organizations violates First 
Amendment freedom of association rights). 
 69. See Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1331–32 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d, 
402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) (addressing plaintiffs’ argument that defendant may 
be liable for indirect participation, or for aiding and abetting others in the 
commission of various human rights abuses); Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 
157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350–51 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (explaining procedural history of 
plaintiffs’ suit against defendant for crimes against humanity).
 70. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845–46 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing 
cruel and inhumane acts for which appellant Ethiopian guard was being charged); 
Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304, at *4 (N.D. Ga. 1993) 
(declaring defendant Ethiopian guard responsible for acts that he personally 
committed and for acts that he ordered, aided and abetted, or participated in).
 71. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 
1992) (elaborating on plaintiff’s argument that Argentina was responsible for official 
acts of torture committed by military personnel stemming from religious 
persecution). 
 72. See Kline v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D.D.C. 1985) 
(summarizing plaintiff’s complaint against not only El Salvador for the acts 
committed by its agents, but also against U.S. officials for failure to investigate 
adequately and report victim’s death).
 73. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000), rev’d, 
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering 
plaintiffs’ claim that Unocal was liable for human rights violations committed against 
them by Burmese military officials acting in furtherance of an oil pipeline project 
involving Unocal); Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (entertaining a cause of action against defendant Unocal for acts 
committed by Burmese agents against Burmese villagers because of Unocal’s alleged 
implied partnership with the Burmese government). 
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violates the First Amendment, has similarly brought lawsuits against a 
number of international villains.74
Of course, many of these cases may be distinguished from the 
terrorist-financing ATA cases because they sought damages directly 
from individuals who themselves engaged in the violent acts abroad, 
rather than those who provided them support stateside.75  This 
distinction, however, would not explain the position the ACLU and 
the CCR took in civil lawsuits involving American entities that 
provided support to the Apartheid regime in South Africa76 and 
Israel.77
To appreciate this inconsistency, one must visit the arguments.  In 
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,78 a private citizen sued the HLF, 
which invoked the First Amendment right of free association.79  The 
HLF argued that “[t]o allow a cause of action to proceed against a 
charitable organization, absent any meaningful allegation of 
involvement in terrorist acts or intent to fund terrorist activity, chills 
the organization’s ability to raise funds and provide relief to those in 
desperate need of humanitarian aid.”80
Essentially, the plaintiff’s claim was that any individual or group 
that donates money for lawful, humanitarian purposes in areas of the 
world in which terrorist organizations operate, from Northern 
                                                          
 74. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 844 (ACLU representing a plaintiff against an 
Ethiopian guard charged with leadership and participation in a campaign of torture 
and violence known as the “Red Terror”); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 
1322, 1327–29 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (ACLU representing a plaintiff against a former 
Bosnian Serb police officer for acts of brutality directed at and committed against 
Bosnian non-Serbs); Kline, 603 F. Supp. at 1314 (ACLU representing a plaintiff 
against El Salvador for acts committed by its soldiers and against U.S. officials for 
allegedly covering up the events surrounding the victim’s death). 
 75. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (listing numerous cases). 
 76. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 
2007) (stating plaintiffs’ position that several corporate defendants were responsible 
for cooperating with the South African government in maintaining apartheid).
 77. See generally Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022–23 (W.D. 
Wash. 2005) (plaintiffs contending that Caterpillar should be liable for their family 
member’s death, since it provided the bulldozers to Israel), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  The fact that the U.S. government sought dismissal of the lawsuit on 
foreign policy grounds does not indicate that it is guilty of the same inconsistency I 
have highlighted in this Article.  The basis for the government’s position in Corrie did 
not include the argument that § 2339B is unconstitutional, which I agree would be 
disingenuous.  If the United States took such position that the lawsuit seeks to hold 
Caterpillar liable for First Amendment-protected activity, the inconsistency might be 
fairly argued.  It did not. 
 78. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 79. Id. at 1007. 
 80. Brief of the Appellants at 39, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 
(7th Cir. 2002), Nos. 01-1969 and 01-1970, 2001 WL 34106475, at *39. 
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Ireland to Sri Lanka, can and may be sued for civil damages by U.S. 
victims of violence far from U.S. shores.81
The amicus brief filed by the CCR in Boim disagreed, arguing that 
“Section 2339B penalizes financial contributions to any designated 
foreign terrorist organization, regardless of whether they are directed 
towards the organization’s legitimate political and humanitarian 
activities or its illegal activities.”82  However, as described in Part I of 
this Article, above, the application of § 2339B to prohibit giving 
money to terrorist groups does not violate the First Amendment.83  
The Israel case, Corrie v. Caterpillar,84 involved a lawsuit against the 
Caterpillar company by the family of Rachel Corrie, an American 
peace activist killed by the Israel Defense Forces with a Caterpillar-
provided bulldozer.85  The CCR represented the plaintiffs, arguing 
that imposition of civil liability on Caterpillar was appropriate 
because its action gave substantial assistance to Israel toward the 
accomplishment of a tortious result.86  This standard of liability, the 
CCR argued, did not impose liability by association nor did it erect 
vicarious or strict liability.87  “[I]mposing liability for knowingly 
providing substantial assistance in the commission of internationally 
wrongful conduct requires no revolutionary insight.  It only requires 
faithful adherence to the understanding of the [American law] at its 
inception and the application of modern common law principles.”88  
Meanwhile, however, the CCR filed an amicus brief in support of the 
plaintiffs’ case in the South Africa Apartheid case, Khulumani v. 
Barclay National Bank, Ltd.89
                                                          
 81. See id. at *3 (stating that U.S. law, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, provides a legal remedy 
for U.S. citizens who are victims of terrorism violence and that those individuals who 
aid the terrorists may be held liable under the law). 
 82. Amici Curiae Brief of the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom and 
the Center for Constitutional Rights in Support of Defendants-Appellants’ Appeal 
from the Denial of Their Motions to Dismiss the Complaint at 25, Boim v. Quranic 
Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (No. 00 C 2905), 2001 WL 34106476, at 
*25. 
 83. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (explaining that the freedom of 
association can extend to financial transactions but is not absolute by any means). 
 84. 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 85. Id. at 1022–23. 
 86. Id. at 1023. 
 87. See id. at 1024 (noting Caterpillar’s argument that it could not be liable for 
merely doing business with Israel). 
 88. Jeff Breinholt, J’Accuse:  Lawfare Lawyers Storming the Courts, ACCURACY IN 
MEDIA, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.aim.org/guest-column/jaccuse-lawfare-lawyers-
storming-the-courts. 
 89. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(arguing that defendants actively worked with the South African government in 
perpetuating the Apartheid system of government).
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How can these seemingly conflicting positions be harmonized?  
One argument for the CCR is that the Khulumani and Corrie lawsuits 
were brought under a different statute than what was in play in Boim, 
and the former did not depend on § 2339B to establish liability by the 
defendants.90  However, their constitutional arguments in the § 2339B 
and ATA cases cannot be limited to the statute, since the claims in 
Khulumani and Corrie sought to do the same thing that the ATA did 
for the plaintiffs in Boim—extend liability to people uninvolved in the 
direct violence, whose only role was providing the resources that 
made the violence possible.91  In other words, if § 2339B is 
unconstitutional because of this impact, so is the application of any 
other statute that has the exact same impact in a particular case. 
In response to this argument, the CCR might argue that the 
plaintiffs in Khulumani and Corrie had to prove the foreseeability to 
the defendants of the consequences of providing support.  This legal 
requirement distinguishes those two cases from Boim.  About the 
Corrie lawsuit, Jennifer Green, Senior Attorney for CCR, stated, 
“International law clearly provides that corporations can be held 
accountable for violations of international human rights.  Rachel 
Corrie, a young American killed abroad because Caterpillar 
purposefully turns a blind eye as to how their products are used, must 
have access to justice.”92
However, foreseeability is exactly what the § 2339B designation 
process was intended to instill; with the designation of Hamas, 
everyone is on constructive or actual notice that terrorist acts by 
Hamas are a foreseeable consequence of providing money to Hamas.  
If anything, foreseeability is even greater in the conduct alleged in 
Boim.  Because the United States has made the former illegal per se, 
an individual who provides funds to Hamas causes more foreseeable, 
and therefore greater, harm than does an individual who provides 
bulldozers to the Israeli government or banking services to the 
Apartheid government of South Africa.  Judged this way, the Boim 
lawsuit presents First Amendment issues of less magnitude than Corrie 
and Khulumani.  Still, to groups like the CCR, Boim reflects an 
 90. Compare Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258 (Alien Tort Claims Act), and Corrie, 403 
F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (Torture Victim Protection Act), with Boim v. Quranic Literacy 
Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (18 U.S.C. § 2333). 
 91. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1000–03 (stating that the Boims argue that the 
defendants should be held liable for their son’s death due to the defendants’ 
financial support of Hamas, a known terrorist organization). 
 92. Arab America Media Services, Rachel Corrie’s Family Files Lawsuit Against 
Caterpillar (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.aams.blogspot.com/2005/03/rachel-corries-
family-files-lawsuit.html. 
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unconstitutional application of § 2339B in the civil context, whereas 
the lawsuits in the other cases should be permitted.  That is a bizarre 
double standard which, to my knowledge, has never been discussed 
publicly. 
For these lawyers to continue to decry the constitutionality of  
§ 2339B is thus not merely wishful thinking,93 but an attempt to 
establish a double standard.  The implications of their arguments are 
anomalous.  If they were to succeed in getting § 2339B declared 
unconstitutional (an unlikely prospect given all that has been 
decided), they will be a victim of their own success.  The very lawsuits 
they champion would fall by the wayside. 
To be sure, one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom 
fighter.  However, arguing that civil remedies are unconstitutional 
while simultaneously relying on those same remedies for one’s pet 
causes is hypocritical and problematic.  If the rule of law requires 
legal certainty and the application of rules across the board, these 
lawyers cannot have it both ways. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, the United States can constitutionally limit where one 
sends money.  After all, it happens all the time, in a variety of 
different regulatory contexts.  This authority must be exercised in the 
area of terrorism if the United States wants to maintain its leadership 
role in the civilized world.  Despite my criticism of those who argue 
that § 2339 and the corresponding civil remedies are 
 93. It seems this wishful thinking is even exhibited in this very law review issue.  
Professor David Cole’s commentary indeed claims that the material support crime 
cannot be constitutionally applied to the act of giving money, despite all that has 
been decided.  See David Cole, Anti-Terrorism on Trial;  Why the Government Loses 
Funding Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2007, at A19 (“For all practical purposes, the 
[material support] law imposes guilt by association.”).  He also argues, curiously, that 
there was no evidence that the defendants in the Holy Land Foundation prosecution 
provided money to Hamas (which would raise the question of why the defendant’s 
motion for acquittal was denied by the court and the case sent to the jury) and that it 
was denied the opportunity to present exonerating evidence that the Holy Land 
Foundation was not affiliated with Hamas in the civil challenge to its December 2001 
designation.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit’s opinion referred to the evidence presented by 
the organization, which means that it is hardly true that it was denied this 
opportunity.  Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164–66 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Holy Land did respond and the Treasury considered its response 
as well as the new evidence before deciding to redesignate HLF in May 2002. . . .  
HLF has had every opportunity to come forward with some showing that that 
evidence is false or even that its ties to Hamas had been severed.”).  Significantly, the 
D.C. Circuit referred to the Holy Land Foundation-Hamas link as “incontrovertible,” 
which seems to be inconsistent with Professor Cole’s claim that there was “no 
evidence” of such a link.  See id. at 165–66 (stating that the supplemental evidence 
HLF provided on appeal, while ultimately rejected from the administrative review 
claim, “would have made no difference”). 
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unconstitutional in the face of what has become the legal certainty of 
its constitutionality, I am not critical of their efforts to seek justice on 
behalf of aggrieved victims of international crime.  In fact, I 
commend them for these courageous lawsuits and wish them well.  In 
fact, I cringe whenever the United States seeks dismissal of these cases 
on foreign policy grounds.  What I do criticize is the tendency for 
certain lawyers to talk out of both sides of their mouths.  The law is 
settled.  It is high time to get on with enforcing it more aggressively 
against international outlaws of all political stripes.  Hopefully, the 
next President, no matter his or her political party, will agree. 
 
As we enter into the second decade of a terrorist financing regime 
that involves a system of publicly designating international terrorist 
organizations, the law is far clearer than it might have been in 
October 1997, when the first round of designated foreign terrorist 
organizations was announced.  This clarity not only helps people like 
me involved in criminal justice, but it is also a boost for people who 
seek to fight all brands of international violence through the 
American tort system.  These two sides have not yet come together, 
which is a shame.  Imagine how powerful our various legal remedies 
would be if the U.S. intelligence community had access to 
information developed by private lawyers in these matters and vice 
versa.  I hope that is what the future holds.  Yes, I am suggesting that 
the fields of human rights and counterterrorism be joined. 
One way of getting there is to firmly understand that the law is 
settled on whether the United States and her private lawyers can hold 
unscrupulous people responsible for what they do with their money 
and get busy with the tough task of litigating their liability. 
 
